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NINTH CIRCUIT COURT
OF APPEALS
Garza, et al. v. County
of Los Angeles, et al.,
__ F.2d -, 90 D.A.R. 12547,
Nos. 90-55944, 90-55945, 90-56024
(Nov. 2, 1990).

Los Angeles County's Reapportionment
Plan DiscriminatesAgainst Hispanic
Voters
Hispanics in Los Angeles County,
joined by the federal government, filed
this voting rights action in 1988 seeking
a redrawing of the districts for the Los
Angeles County Board of Supervisors.
Plaintiffs alleged that the existing
boundaries, which had been drawn after
the 1980 census, were gerrymandered
boundaries which diluted Hispanic voting strength, and sought redistricting in
order to create a district with a Hispanic
majority for the 1990 Board of
Supervisors election in which two board
members were to be elected.
The Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §
1973, forbids the imposition or application of any practice that would deny or
abridge, on grounds of race or color, the
right of any citizen to vote. As amended
by Congress in 1982, the Act forbids not
only intentional discrimination, but also
any practice shown to have a disparate
impact on minority voting strength.
Plaintiffs claimed that the County
engaged in intentional discrimination in
the drawing of the district lines; the
resulting boundaries violated both the
Voting Rights Act and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
of the federal Constitution; and that,
whether or not the vote dilution was
intentional, the effect of the County's
redistricting plan was the reduction of
Hispanic electoral power in violation of
the Voting Rights Act. Further, plaintiffs
contended that in 1981, as part of a
course of conduct that began decades
earlier, the County intentionally fragmented the Hispanic population among
the various districts in order to dilute the
effect of the Hispanic vote in future
elections.
Following a three-month trial, the
district court concluded that the County
had engaged in intentional discrimination in redistricting during 1959, 1965,
1971, and 1981, and that the reapportionment plan violated the Voting Rights
Act; the district court ordered the
County to propose a redistricting which

would include a district with a Hispanic
voting majority.
In its appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the
County argued that the 1981 redistricting was lawful, regardless of any intentional or unintentional dilution of minority voting strength, because at that time
there could be no single-member district
with a majority of minority voters. The
plaintiffs-appellees countered that this
requirement should not be imposed
where, as here, there has been previous
intentional dilution of minority voting
strength.
The Ninth Circuit agreed with plaintiff-appellees, and affirmed the district
court's holding that the County engaged
in intentional discrimination at the time
the challenged districts were drawn.
Further, the Ninth Circuit was satisfied
that the "intentional splitting of the
Hispanic core resulted in a situation in
which Hispanics had less opportunity
than did other county residents to participate in the political process and to elect
legislators of their choice." As a result,
the court found that this intentional discrimination violated both the Voting
Rights Act and the equal protection
clause.
The County also asserted that the district court erred in requiring it to redistrict at a time between regularly scheduled decennial reapportionments; in considering any data other than data from
the 1980 census; and in employing
statistics based upon the total County
population rather than the voting population. The court rejected each of these
arguments, responding that more frequent apportionment, though "not constitutionally required," is "constitutionally permissible" and even "practicably
desirable"; because redistricting between
censuses is permissible, post-census data
may be used as a basis for such redistricting; and California Elections Code
section 35000 requires districting to be
accomplished on the basis of total population.
The Oregonian Publishing Co. v.
United States District Court;
Frank Riley Wolsky and United States
of America, Real Parties in Interest,

FE2d __, 90 D.A.R. 13860,
No. 90-70275 (Dec. 6, 1990).
Press Has Access to Plea Agreements
Under QualifiedFirstAmendment Right
In this proceeding, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals granted The Oregonian

I
Publishing Company's petition for a writ
of mandamus to obtain access to various
documents relating to a plea agreement
filed under seal in the district court. In
1989, Frank Riley Wolsky was indicted
for various federal drug and firearm
offenses. Wolsky entered into a plea
agreement with the government, the
terms of which were set forth in a letter
from the government dated November
29, 1989. Following Wolsky's filing,
under seal, of a motion to seal the plea
agreement, The Oregonian filed a
motion to intervene for the purpose of
opposing the motion to seal the plea
agreement. After hearing argument on
the motion to seal, the district court
granted Wolsky's motion and ordered
the plea agreement sealed; it also
ordered certain portions of its opinion
and order sealed.
The Oregonian then sought a writ of
mandamus from the Ninth Circuit. Upon
review, the court observed that "plea
agreements have typically been open to
the public" and that "[a]n order denying
access to a plea agreement must satisfy
both the procedural and substantive
requirements of the first amendment." In
determining that the district court complied with the applicable procedural prerequisites, the Ninth Circuit determined
that (1)those excluded from the proceeding were afforded a reasonable
opportunity to state their objections; and
(2) the reasons supporting closure were
articulated in the findings.
The court reiterated the rule that
"criminal proceedings and documents
may be closed to the public without violating the first amendment only if three
substantive requirements are satisfied:
(1) closure serves a compelling interest;
(2) there is a substantial probability that,
in the absence of closure, this compelling interest would be harmed; and
(3) there are no alternatives to closure
that would adequately protect the compelling interest." The Ninth Circuit
determined that because The Oregonian
properly relied upon a qualified right of
access under the first amendment to
obtain disclosure of the plea agreement
and related documents, it enjoyed the
benefit of a presumption that disclosure
should be made; and the district court
should have imposed the burden on
Wolsky to present facts supporting closure and to demonstrate that any available alternatives would not protect his
interests. The court ruled that Wolsky
failed to carry that burden; thus "the
press has a right of access under the first
amendment to the plea agreement and
related documents."
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UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURTS
United States of America, ex rel.
Guy D. McCoy and Frank Helium v.
California Medical Review, Inc.,
et al.,
F.Supp __, 90 D.A.R. 14240,
No. C-88-3659-MHP (N.D. Cal.,
Dec. 5, 1990).

__

False Claims Act Settlement Hearings
Must be Open and Include All Plaintiffs
Acting as qui tam plaintiffs under the
False Claims Amendments Act of 1986
(Act), 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733, plaintiffs/relators McCoy and Helium (plaintiffs) filed this action in September
1988, alleging fraudulent practices by
the defendants in violation of the Act.
Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. section 3730(b)(4)(A), the United States filed its first
amended complaint on March 22, 1989,
seeking damages and civil penalties
arising from false claims and reports
allegedly submitted by the defendants to the Health Care Financing
Administration. The United States and
defendants reached agreement on a proposed settlement of the civil action;
plaintiffs opposed the proposed settlement, claiming that it was "grossly inadequate," and requested discovery on the
matter. The United States and defendants then moved that the hearing on the
proposed settlement be held in camera
and that all briefs filed in connection
with the hearing be sealed; McCoy and
Helium opposed this motion.
The court reviewed the language and
legislative history of the False Claims
Act, and determined that "there is a presumption in favor of open settlement
hearings." Although 31 U.S.C. section
3730(c)(2)(B) provides that, upon a
showing of good cause, settlement hearings may be held in camera, the court
noted that the term "good cause" is not
defined in the Act. Therefore, the court
looked for guidance to other statutes and
authority, and found that the term, as
used in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(c), requires "a showing that disclosure will work a clearly defined, specific
and serious injury." The court found that
defendants and the United States failed
to make a showing of good cause under
that standard or any other of which the
court could conceive. Further, the court
determined that defendants and the
United States failed to identify any
"overriding interest" which would mandate the closure of judicial proceedings.
Finally, the court granted plaintiffs'

request for a hearing and discovery on
the proposed settlement agreement.
According to the court, qui tam plaintiffs may raise objections to the proposed settlement at the fairness hearing;
the right to limited discovery is a corollary to that right to object. (See CRLR
Vol. 9, No. 4 (Fall 1989) pp. 139-40 and
Vol. 9, No. 3 (Summer 1989) pp. 131-32
for information on other False Claims
Act cases.)
CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT
Taxpayers to Limit Campaign
Spendingv. Fair Political Practices
Commission,
Cal. 3d __ 90 D.A.R. 12502,
No. S012016 (November I, 1990).
Provisionsof Proposition 73
Overrule Those of Proposition68
At the June 7, 1988 primary election,
California voters approved two initiative
statutes, Propositions 68 and 73, both of
which sought to regulate political campaign contributions and spending by
amending and supplementing the
Political Reform Act of 1974;
Proposition 73 received more votes than
Proposition 68. Article II, section 10(b)
of the California Constitution provides
that "[i]f provisions of 2 or more measures approved at the same election conflict, those of the measure receiving the
highest affirmative vote shall prevail."
The Fair Political Practices Commission
(FPPC), having concluded that section
10(b) applied only where an irreconcilable conflict existed, compared the two
measures provision by provision, and
found that most of Proposition 68's provisions conflicted with provisions of
Proposition 73 or were not severable
from other provisions which did conflict. However, the FPPC also identified
several provisions of Proposition 68
which it determined were not in direct
conflict with Proposition 73, and ruled
that those provisions should become
operative. (See CRLR Vol. 10, No. 4
(Fall 1990) pp. 189-90; Vol. 9, No. 4
(Fall 1989) pp. 140-41; and Vol. 8, No.
2 (Spring 1988) p. 1 for extensive background information on Propositions 68
and 73.)
Petitioner, an association which
sponsored Proposition 68, filed a writ of
mandamus in the Second District Court
of Appeal, seeking to compel the FPPC
to enforce additional provisions of
Proposition 68. The court concluded that
it too was obligated to-attempt to reconcile and give effect to the provisions of
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both measures to the maximum extent
possible, and held that several additional
provisions of Proposition 68 were not
irreconcilable with Proposition 73, and
directed that they be enforced.
The California Supreme Court granted review to consider the FPPC's argument that these additional provisions of
Proposition 68 were in irreconcilable
conflict with Proposition 73, advising
the parties that it would also consider
whether the FPPC and appellate court
had properly applied section 10(b) in
their efforts to give effect to those provisions of Proposition 68 which they concluded did not conflict with provisions
of Proposition 73.
The court reviewed the previous four
attempts which had been made to determine the effect of the voters' simultaneous approval of both initiative measures,
noting that in each, the agency or court
assumed that section 10(b) mandated a
provision-by-provision analysis of the
two measures and enforcement of each
provision of Proposition 68 which did
not conflict with Proposition 73, was
severable from the remainder of
Proposition 68, and was intended by the
voters to become effective regardless of
the invalidity of the remainder. In rejecting this assumption, the court stated that
section 10(b) does not "contemplate
enforcement of any provisions of an initiative that receives a majority of the
votes cast when another initiative on the
same ballot, directed to the same subject
and offered as a competing regulatory
scheme, receives a greater majority."
The court held that the interpretation of
section 10(b) adopted by Petitioner, the
FPPC, and the court of appeal-that
nonconflicting, severable provisions of
the initiative(s) receiving the lesser affirmative vote are operable-"is not the
only reasonable understanding of the
section." Instead, the court created its
own interpretation of section 10(b),
holding that "when initiatives with provisions that are in fundamental conflict
receive affirmative votes at the same
election, only the provisions of the
measure receiving the highest affirmative vote are operative." Further, the
court reviewed the contents of both
measures and the manner in which they
were drafted and presented to the voters,
and decided that Propositions 68 and 73
"were competing initiative measures
offering
alternative
regulatory
schemes," thereby establishing a fundamental conflict. As a result, despite
receiving the approval of the California
voters, none of Proposition 68's provisions will be given effect.
Both Propositions 68 and 73 were
ill-fated. Shortly before the California
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Supreme Court issued this decision
invalidating Proposition 68, the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of
California struck down Proposition 73's
contribution limits under the first
amendment. (See CRLR Vol. 10, No. 4
(Fall 1990) pp. 189-90 for background
information.) Thus, at this writing, and
contrary to the clear intent of the electorate in enacting both Propositions 68
and 73, there are no campaign contribution limits applicable to state legislative
or statewide office races in California.
Robert D. Raven, et al. v.
George Deukmejian, et al.,
52 Cal. 3d 336, 90 D.A.R. 14642,
No. S016137 (Dec. 24, 1990).
California Supreme Court Upholds
Validity of Proposition 115
While Eliminating Key Provision
In this proceeding instituted by a
group of taxpayers and voters, the
California Supreme Court reviewed two
challenges to the constitutionality of
Proposition 115, the "Crime Victims
Justice Reform Act" passed in June
1990. Although first filed as a writ of
mandate or prohibition in the court of
appeal, the Supreme Court exercised its
original jurisdiction and granted respondent's motion to transfer the proceeding
to the high court.
Proposition 115 limits various pretrial procedural rights for criminal defendants and expands the Penal Code by
creating new offenses, increasing penalties, and providing for speedier trials.
The petitioners challenged Proposition
115 by claiming that (1)the measure
violates the state constitution's "single
subject" rule (Article II, section 8(d));
and (2) a constitutional "revision" such
as that sought by Proposition 115 is
beyond the scope of the initiative process, and must be accomplished by more
formal procedures than are contemplated for mere constitutional "amendments" (Article XVIII).
In rejecting Petitioner's argument
that Proposition 115 violates the "single
subject" rule, which limits each proposition to only one issue, the court noted
that "an initiative measure does not violate the single-subject requirement 'if,
despite its varied collateral effects, all of
its parts are "reasonably germane" to
each other,' and to the general purpose
or object of the initiative." The court
held that "the various elements of
Proposition 115 unite to form a comprehensive criminal justice reform package" and that they "reflect a consistent
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theme or purpose to nullify particular
decisions of our court affecting various
aspects of the criminal justice system."
Petitioner's second argument, that
Proposition 115 in effect achieved a
constitutional revision rather than a
mere amendment, focused primarily on
Proposition 115's amendment to article
I, section 24 of the constitution, relating
to the independent nature of certain
rights guaranteed by the state constitution; this amendment limited the rights
of criminal defendants to those
expressed in the federal Constitution.
The court agreed with the petitioners
that this limitation constituted a revision
rather than an amendment of the state
constitution, by in effect "vest[ing] all
judicial interpretive power, as to fundamental criminal defense rights, in the
United States Supreme Court." The
court stated that this limitation would
substantially alter the integrity and independent effect of California court decisions. Thus, by vesting the ultimate protection of criminal defendants from
deprivation of constitutional rights
exclusively in the U.S. Supreme Court,
the court found that this provision
accomplishes "such far reaching
changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision." Although acknowledging a general principle of deference to Supreme
Court decisions, the court rejected the
notion of "blind obedience" to that
court's decisions.
Although the court found that article
I, section 24 represents an invalid revision of the state constitution, it upheld
the remaining provisions of Proposition
115 as "clearly severable from the
invalid portion." However, challenges to
other individual provisions are pending
in lower courts.
AIU Insurance Company v. Superior
Court of Santa Clara
County; FMC
Corporation, Real Party in Interest,
Cal. 3d. __, 90 D.A.R. 12891,
No. S012525 (Nov. 15, 1990).
Insurers May Be Obligated to Pay
For CERCLA "Response" Costs
In this proceeding, the California
Supreme Court was asked to decide
whether, under comprehensive general
liability (CGL) insurance policies issued
by insurers to FMC Corporation, the
insurers are obligated to provide coverage to FMC for clean-up and other
"response" costs incurred pursuant to
the Comprehensive Environmental

Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et
seq., and related state and federal environmental laws. On November 15, a
unanimous court declared that the cost
of government-ordered clean-up of toxic
wastes does constitute "damages" that
are covered under the CGL policies
issued to thousands of businesses over
the past fifty years.
The insurance industry argued that
CGL policies do not cover costs
incurred pursuant to a governmental
clean-up injunction; that is, the standard
CGL policy-which covers "all sums
which the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because
of bodily injury or property
damage"-does not cover costs incurred
due to injunctions issued in equity.
Applying traditional rules of interpretation to the insurance policies, and using
the "ordinary and popular sense" of
words to resolve any ambiguities in
favor of the policyholder, the court
determined that some of the adverse
orders issued in CERCLA suits will
"legally obligate" FMC to pay such
costs; the costs will constitute "damages" or "ultimate net loss," and such
costs will be incurred because of "property damage."
Peralta Community College District
v. Fair Employment and Housing
Commission;Rose Brown,
Real Party in Interest,
52 Cal. 3d 40, 276 Cal. Rptr. 114,
No. S009487 (Dec. 20, 1990).
Job Discrimination Victims
May No Longer Seek Compensation
For Emotional Distress
From State Commission
In this proceeding, the California
Supreme Court considered whether the
Fair Employment and Housing
Commission (Commission) is statutorily
authorized by the California Fair
Employment and Housing Act (Act) to
award compensatory damages to victims
of job discrimination. The Commission
had awarded $20,000 to a former Peralta
Community College District (Peralta)
employee, finding that the employee had
been subjected to various acts of sexual
the
Specifically,
harassment.
Commission stated that the $20,000
award was "to compensate [the employee] for the damage to her dignity and
esteem, and [for] her humiliation,
embarrassment, emotional pain and distress."
Peralta sought a writ of administrative mandamus from the superior court;
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the court denied the petition as to the
Commission's findings of sexual harassment, but ordered stricken that part of
the decision awarding the former
employee compensatory damages, as
not within the Commission's authority.
The appellate court reversed, finding
that the Commission is authorized by
the Act to award compensatory damages.
In Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment and Housing Commission, 43 Cal.
3d 1379, 241 Cal. Rptr. 67 (1987), the
California Supreme Court rejected the
argument that the expansive language of
the Act, taken together with the legislative statement of purpose and directive
that the Act should be liberally construed, authorized the Commission to
award punitive damages. As in DynaMed, the Peralta court primarily
focused its discussion on the statute
itself. The court acknowledged that the
"stated purpose of the [Act] is to provide effective remedies that will eliminate discriminatory practices" and that
compensatory damages may "deter the
respondent and other employers from
future discriminatory practices."
However, the court stated that an award
of compensatory damages "goes beyond
the context of employment" and
"serve[s] to recompense the victim of
discrimination not just for the tangible
detriment to the victim's employment
situation, but also for the intangible
injury to his or her psyche suffered as a
result of the unlawful action of another
and, as such, [is] designed to make the
victim whole in relation to the offender
in the manner of traditional tort damages awarded by a jury in private action
in a court of law." According to the
court, this effect is beyond the scope of
the Act's intended purpose to prevent
and eliminate discrimination in the
workplace.
As a result, the court concluded that
in view of the failure of the Act to
"expressly authorize an award of general compensatory damages, the existence
in other civil rights statutes of express
authorization for such awards, [and] the
unlikelihood of a legislative grant by
implication of unbridled power to an
administrative agency to make monetary
awards without guidelines or limitations," the Commission is not authorized to award compensatory damages.
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Citizens of Goleta Valley, et al. v.
Board of Supervisors of the County
of Santa Barbara, et al.; Wallover,
Inc., et al. Real Parties in Interest,
__ Cal. 3d -, 90 D.A.R. 129,
Nos. S013629, B037615
(Dec. 31, 1990).
Environmental Impact Report
for Project
Must Consider Reasonable Alternatives
Culminating a decade-long effort by
real parties in interest Wallover, Inc.,
and Hyatt Corporation (collectively
Hyatt) to build a resort hotel on 73 acres
of undeveloped oceanfront land in Santa
Barbara County (County), the California
Supreme Court determined that the
environmental impact report (EIR) prepared by the project proponents adequately considered a reasonable range of
alternatives to the project, including
alternative locations as required under
the California Environmental Quality
Act (CEQA). In 1983, Hyatt filed an
application with the County for development of the property; an EIR analyzing
the project was certified as complete in
September 1984, and rezoning and local
coastal program amendments designating the land for visitor-serving commercial development were approved. The
California Coastal Commission subsequently granted a coastal development
permit subject to certain conditions.
The EIR examined four development
alternatives: no project; clustered highdensity residential development; a
smaller, 340-unit resort hotel and conference center south of Highway 101;
and the alternative ultimately approved,
a 400-unit hotel, with the potential for
second-phase development of an additional 100 hotel rooms and 24 villas.
There was no in-depth consideration of
any alternative location for the project.
In Goleta 1, 197 Cal. App. 3d 1167
(1988), the Second District Court of
Appeal set aside the EIR certification,
finding that "the omission from the EIR
of consideration of whether there was a
feasible alternate site or sites was unreasonable and rendered the EIR inadequate...." As a result, a supplemental
EIR was prepared to address some of
the concerns raised in the first appeal;
the final EIR released in November
1987 contained an expanded discussion
of an alternative location for the project.
Following a number of public hearings,
the County Board of Supervisors
(Board) approved Hyatt's final development plan. The Citizens of Goleta
Valley, a coalition of groups opposed to
the project, appealed on the sole ground
that the Board failed to comply with the
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judicial directive concerning alternative
sites. The trial court found in favor of
Hyatt, but the appellate court again held
that the EIR failed to delineate facts sufficient to explain its rejection of a sufficient number of alternative sites, and
therefore was still inadequate.
The California Supreme Court
reversed. In reviewing agency actions
under CEQA, Public Resources Code
section 21168.5 provides that a court's
inquiry "shall extend only to whether
there was a prejudicial abuse of discretion. Abuse of discretion is established
if the agency has not proceeded in a
manner required by law or if the determination or decision is not supported by
substantial evidence." Further, the court
noted that "CEQA establishes no categorical legal imperative as to the scope
of alternatives to be analyzed in an
EIR...," and that the "EIR here considered a full range of project alternatives,
including at least one reasonable off-site
alternative." Thus, the court concluded
that the "record evidence substantially
supports the Board's conclusion that
none of the additional sites represented a
feasible project alternative or merited
extended discussion in the EIR" and that
it could not "classify the Board's decision to issue the final EIR as an abuse of
discretion."
Lesher Communications, Inc., et al.
v. City of Walnut Creek,
Cal. 3d - 91 D.A.R. 135,
No. S012604 (Dec. 31, 1990).
Initiative Limiting Municipal Growth
Is Not a General Plan Amendment
In this proceeding, the California
Supreme Court considered whether a
Walnut Creek initiative measure limiting
municipal growth which conflicts with
the city's general plan amends that plan,
and, if it is not an amendment, whether
it is invalid. The state's Planning and
Zoning Law, Government Code section
65000 et seq., mandates the adoption of
a general plan by every city and every
county in this state; once a city has
adopted a general plan, all zoning ordinances must be consistent with that
plan, and to be consistent must be "compatible with the objectives, policies,
general land uses, and programs specified in such a plan."
As of November 5, 1985, the date on
which Measure H, the initiative ordinance in issue here, was adopted, the
general plan of the City of Walnut Creek
was growth-oriented. The general plan
anticipated and acknowledged that
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"[clommute-hour congestion experienced along [certain roadways] will
continue to increase as new development occurs. Although some minor
improvements can be made to these
roadways, drivers will have to adjust to
an increased level of congestion."
Measure H, designated as the "Traffic
Control Initiative," creates a building
moratorium triggered by traffic congestion on many of the city's roadways.
Plaintiffs challenged the validity of
Measure H, asserting that (1) Measure H
was a land use ordinance which operated as a zoning ordinance and was inconsistent with the city's general plan, and
(2) the general plan itself was invalid.
After trial, the court directed issuance of
a peremptory writ of mandate commanding Walnut Creek to void Measure
H and to cease enforcing it, ruling that
Measure H was invalid because it conflicted with the general plan's goals and
policy of growth. Walnut Creek
appealed, arguing that Measure H was
consistent with the city's general plan
because it was compatible with the progrowth policies expressed in the general
plan; the city argued in the alternative
that Measure H was valid as an amendment of the general plan. The First
District Court of Appeal rejected the
argument that Measure H was consistent
with the general plan, but held that the
initiative must be construed as an
amendment to the general plan.
The California Supreme Court
reversed, holding that Measure H does
not identify an existing provision of the
general plan that is to be amended by
adoption of the measure, nor does it
state that it is an addition to the plan.
According to the court, "[a]bsent some
basis in the title, the ballot summary, or
elsewhere in the ballot materials to support a conclusion that the voters both
understood that the purpose of Measure
H was to amend the Walnut Creek general plan and that they intended to do so,
Measure H cannot be deemed a general
plan amendment." Because it conflicted
with, and was not an amendment to,
Walnut Creek's general plan, the court
concluded that Measure H was invalid
at the time it was passed.
Draper v. City of Los Angeles,
Cal. 3d _, 91 D.A.R. 265,
No. S011881 (Dec. 31, 1990).

__

Physicaland Mental Injuries Allow
Late Filing of Claim Against
Government
In this proceeding, the California
Supreme Court considered whether a
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plaintiff physically unable to file a claim
against a governmental entity within
100 days of an accident may be denied
relief from the Government Code's
claim-filing requirements on the ground
that an attorney, purporting to act on her
behalf, filed a timely claim against a
governmental entity different from the
entity plaintiff now seeks to hold liable.
Plaintiff was injured on June 11, 1987,
when she was struck by a car driven by
a high school student in a crosswalk in
the Panorama City district of Los
Angeles. At the time of plaintiff's accident, Government Code section 911.2
required that a personal injury claim
against a governmental entity must be
filed within 100 days of the accrual of a
cause of action; sections 911.4 and
911.6 set forth the procedures for filing
a late claim.
During the 100-day claim-filing period, an attorney acting on plaintiff's
behalf filed a claim against Los Angeles
Unified School District; that claim was
rejected on September 11, 1987.
On November 4, 1987, almost two
months after the 100-day claim-filing
period had elapsed, plaintiff applied for
permission to file a late claim with the
City of Los Angeles, the Los Angeles
Unified School District, and several
governmental units, alleging that the
accident had been caused by defects in
the design of the intersection. Plaintiff
claimed that she had not filed a timely
claim because she was severely injured
in the accident, suffered permanent
brain damage, was unconscious and hospitalized for a long time, and did not
have the assistance of counsel. The petitions were denied by operation of law.
Plaintiff then sought relief from the
claim-filing requirement in superior
court; however, the court ruled that the
claim filed by the attorney acting on
plaintiff's behalf during the 100-day
claim-filing period against the Los
Angeles Unified School District demonstrated that any failure to file a claim
against the city and other governmental
units within that time was not cause by
plaintiff's disability. The appellate court
affirmed, even though it found that
plaintiff had presented "powerful evidence" that she was serious disabled
during the 100 days following the accident.
The California Supreme Court rejected the lower courts' finding that the
attorney in question was acting as plaintiff's attorney when he filed the claim,
and that because plaintiff had not repudiated his actions she was bound by
them. The court noted that under
Government Code section 946.6(c)(3), it
is the incapacity of the person who

failed to file a claim that is in issue, and
ruled that plaintiff's incapacity during
the 100-day claim-filing period prevented her from ensuring that a timely claim
was filed.
CALIFORNIA COURTS
OF APPEAL
R.H. Macy & Company, Inc. v.
Contra Costa County,
- Cal. App. 3d -, 90 D.A.R. 14600,
No. A049789 (Dec. 19, 1990).
Nordlinger v. Lynch, et al.,
- Cal. App. 3d -, 90 D.A.R. 13895,
No. B048719 (Dec. 3, 1990).
In these proceedings, the First
District Court of Appeal and the Second
District Court of Appeal, respectively,
each upheld the constitutionality of
Proposition 13, which was adopted by
the California voters on June 6, 1978,
despite a recent U.S. Supreme Court
decision, Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal v.
Webster County, 488 U.S. 336 (1989),
rejecting a similar tax assessment
scheme. (See CRLR Vol. 9, No. 1
(Winter 1989) p. 111 for background
information on Allegheny.)
In Macy, appellants challenged
Proposition 13's change in ownership
provisions which allow the property tax
assessment to be based upon the fair
market value of the property at the time
of ownership change rather than at its
1975 (base year) value. Appellants
argued that as far as commercial property is concerned, the change in ownership
provision, commonly known as the
"welcome stranger" provision, violates
the equal protection and commerce
clauses of the federal Constitution and
impairs the interstate right to travel. The
First District noted that the "California
Supreme Court long ago laid to rest the
protection challenge to
equal
Proposition 13's change in ownership
provisions" in Arnador Valley Joint
Union High School District v. State
Board of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 208
(1978); further, the court noted that
Amador does not distinguish between
commercial and residential property.
The court distinguished the Allegheny
decision, stating that Allegheny "grew
out of a different legal and factual background" and "expressly refused to pass
upon the constitutionalityof [Proposition
13], and, hence, left the precedential
force of Amador unaffected." Finally,
the First District determined that
Proposition 13 "does not impose direct
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restrictions on interstate travel, nor does
it discriminate against non-California
property owners, nor does it impose
durational/residence requirements on
interstate mobility."
In Nordlinge, plaintiff also attacked
Proposition 13's "welcome stranger"
provision, alleging that the dramatic disparities created by this tax assessment
method had been rendered unconstitutional by Allegheny. The Second District
Court of Appeal relied on Amador in
rejecting each of plaintiff's arguments,
and found the Allegheny decision inapposite. The court determined that
Allegheny does not stand for the general
proposition that a welcome stranger
approach which bases assessed value on
acquisition cost violates equal protection; nor does Allegheny hold that large
disparities in the assessments of properties with similar current market values
are unconstitutional per se.
Plaintiffs in both cases have sought
review by the California Supreme
Court.
Farnow v. Superior Court of the
State of California, In and For the
County of San Mateo; San Mateo
County Grand Jury,
Real Party in Interest,
226 Cal. App. 3d 481, 276 Cal. Rptr.
275, No. A050322 (Dec. 18, 1990).
Civil Grand Jury ProceedingsRemain
Closed To the Public and Lawyers for
Witnesses

into a statute ensuring such privacy only
for criminal sessions of the grand jury.
Prior to its amendment in 1988, section
939 provided that "[n]o person other
than those specified in Article 3 (commencing with Section 934), and in
Sections 939.1 and 939.11 is permitted
to be present during the session of the
grand jury except the members and witnesses actually under examination. No
person other than those specified in
Section 939.11 shall be permitted to be
present during the expression of the
opinions of the grand jurors, or the giving of their votes upon any matter
before them." However, 1988 amendments to this section provide for the
exclusion of all but the specified persons
from "criminal sessions" rather than all
sessions of the grand jury.
In rejecting petitioner's arguments,
the court stated that "[d]espite the apparent import of the addition of the word
'riminal' to section 939,...the effect of a
literal interpretation of this statute-to
make civil sessions of the grand jury
open to the public-would work so profound a change in the nature of grand
jury proceedings that we must hesitate
to adopt it." The court concluded that
such an interpretation "would render the
statute inconsistent with other provisions of law governing grand jury proceedings." Further, the court noted that
"the legislative history of the 1988
amendment contains no indication of
any intent to depart from the long history of secrecy in.grand jury proceedings."

Petitioner Raymond Farnow,
Commissioner of the San Mateo County
Harbor District, was served with a subpoena requiring him to appear at a civil
session of the San Mateo County Grand
Jury; the grand jury refused petitioner's
request to have an attorney present during his testimony. The superior court
denied petitioner's ex parte application
for an order staying his appearance
pending a hearing on an order to show
cause why his attorney should not be
allowed to attend the session. The First
District Court of Appeal issued an order
prohibiting the grand jury from compelling petitioner's appearance and testimony without the presence of his attorney pending the appellate court's determination of petitioner's petition for writ
of prohibition.
On the merits, the First District considered the effect of a 1988 amendment
to Penal Code Section 939, which
appears on its face to have transformed
the statute preserving the privacy of all
sessions of the grand jury (by allowing
only specified persons to be present)
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